The Cold War and The Retention of British Rule in Cyprus, 1945-1947 by Hussain, Norasmahani
 
European Proceedings of 
Social and Behavioural Sciences  
EpSBS 
 
www.europeanproceedings.com e-ISSN: 2357-1330 
 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 





ICH 2019  
International Conference on Humanities   
 
THE COLD WAR AND THE RETENTION OF BRITISH RULE IN 
CYPRUS, 1945-1947   
 
 
Norasmahani Hussain (a)*  
*Corresponding author 
 





The Mediterranean island of Cyprus was proclaimed as a Crown colony of Britain in 1925. Cyprus’ 
inhabitants, particularly the Greek Cypriots, strongly asked for enosis (union) with Greece; hence they 
revolted against British rule in Cyprus. This paper will detail Britain’s decision with regards to the 
retention of its rule in Cyprus, despite the Greek islanders’ pressure that Cyprus be handed back to 
Greece. The strategic geographical location of Cyprus, being near to British route to the Middle East and 
the Eastern Empire, is a notable issue reflected in existing literature. A number of historians agreed that 
this was the obvious justification for Britain to decline the Greek Cypriots’ demand for enosis and thus 
maintaining British rule in Cyprus. The prime objective of this paper is to identify the reason for Britain 
to stay in Cyprus from a point of view that has acquired slight scholarly consideration. This paper has 
concentrated on the viewpoint of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and his Foreign Office through 
the perusal of archival or primary records such as Bevin’s Private Papers (FO 800), the Cabinet Office 
Papers (CAB), the Foreign Office Papers (FO 371), the Defence Ministry Papers (DEFE) and the House 
of Commons Parliamentary Debate (HANSARD). The scrutiny of these records has discovered that Bevin, 
Head of the Foreign Office, wanted to stay in Cyprus due to the Cold War tension in Greece. It seemed 
likely that Cyprus would also turn communist if it was ceded to Greece during this crucial time. 
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The Cyprus question was a long-standing controversial subject that went through several phases: 
Cyprus under the Ottoman Empire’s domination, Cyprus under British rule, and Cyprus as a sovereign 
republic. The period under British rule can be divided into three main phases: the period between 1878 
and 1914 when Cyprus was administered by Britain but was still considered part of the Ottoman Empire, 
the period from 1914 to 1925 when Cyprus was annexed by Britain to the British empire due to the 
outbreak of war with Turkey, and the period from 1925 until 1960 in which Cyprus was a British Crown 
Colony (Alastos, 1976). The focus of this paper is the later part of the third phase of British rule in 
Cyprus. 
This paper concentrates on the British policy on Cyprus between 1945 and 1947 with regards to 
two issues involving the Cyprus question: British strategic interest in Cyprus and the question of enosis 
(union) with Greece. The latter issue regarding enosis is about the demand of the Greek Cypriots for 
Britain to hand Cyprus over to Greece. According to Kelling (1990), ‘Greek Cypriots felt themselves part 
of the Greek nation and their aspirations for Enosis were part of the same movement which created 
Greece and added Crete (and for that matter Athens) to the Greek state’. Apparently, Greek Cypriots were 
inspired by the Megali idea (Grand Design) of Greece. This idea was an irredentist concept of Greek 
nationalism that aimed for the establishment of a Greek state in the Eastern Mediterranean by 
encompassing territories in Europe and Western Asia Minor, which were estimated by Athens as ethnic 
Greek-inhabited areas. Eighty percent of the Cyprus population were Greek Cypriots. Being the majority 
population in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots felt that Cyprus was qualified to be a part of the Greek state. This 
was the reason Greek Cypriots consistently fought for enosis. Their desire for enosis had stemmed from 
the era of Ottoman rule and was manifested later at the time of the British occupation of Cyprus. 
British rule in Cyprus began when the Cyprus Convention was signed at the Congress of Berlin in 
June 1878. Article I of the Cyprus Convention between Britain and Turkey stated that Britain was given 
consent by the Sublime Porte to occupy and administer the island of Cyprus in order to enable Britain to 
make the necessary provisions for executing its engagement in helping the Sublime Porte against possible 
Russian aggression (Hill, 1952; Joseph, 2009). The Convention was abrogated by Britain in 1914 when 
the Ottoman Empire decided to join the First World War in favour of the Central Powers. Cyprus 
therefore was annexed to the British Empire. 
In 1925, Cyprus became a Crown colony of Britain. The British government, the official sovereign 
power in Cyprus since 1878, had encountered problems with Cyprus’ inhabitants who strongly asked for 
self-determination from Britain. Apart from this, one of the islanders, namely the Greek Cypriots, also 
demanded a union (enosis) with Greece as it was considered Cyprus’ mother country by them. Initially, 
Britain, specifically the Foreign Office and its superior officer Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, did not 
take these matters seriously, especially the enosis question. As a result, in 1931 the Greek Cypriots 
revolted against British rule in Cyprus. Since then, the sentiment for enosis gradually became stronger 
and was fused with an insurrection against the British administration in Cyprus. 
Greece was also inevitably affected by the question of enosis because Greek Cypriots wanted to 
unite with this nation. Greece’s reaction to enosis differed according to the times. At the beginning of 
irredentist nationalism, Greece was ready to take over Cyprus from Britain. But after Greece was defeated 
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by the Turkish National Movement in Asia Minor in 1922, Greece’s ambition for the Megali idea had to 
be dismissed. However, Greece’s interest over Cyprus was once again revived after World War II came to 
an end. As Greece participated in the World War II as Britain’s only fighting ally in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region, the British government therefore was ready to consider enosis (Hatzivassiliou, 
2009). Accordingly, this new development forced ministers and officials in the newly elected Labour 
government that came into office in July 1945, to reconsider Britain’s position in Cyprus and to re-
evaluate British strategic interest in Cyprus. 
   
2. Problem Statement 
Cyprus is situated in the eastern Mediterranean, which is at the crossroad of sea routes of three 
geographical areas: the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Europe. This position contributed to the 
strategic significance of Cyprus. This geostrategic value elevated Cyprus’ importance in the international 
political scene. For instance, in the course of the World War II, Cyprus was used as a military defence 
base because of a threat of attacks through Turkey (Playfair et al., 2004). Later on, during the 1956 Suez 
crisis, Britain used Cyprus as a base for launching an attack on the Suez Canal (Eden, 1960; Varble, 
2003). However, the Greek Cypriots and their mother country, Greece, strongly demanded enosis. The 
British government, particularly the Foreign Office, therefore had a dilemma as to which decision should 
be made: to continue British control over Cyprus or to abandon Cyprus’ strategic value to Britain by 
agreeing to enosis. 
Historians such as Wm. Roger Louis (1978), Allan Bullock (1983), George H. Kelling (1990), 
Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (2009) and Simon Ball (2010) discussed that the British Foreign Office’s 
decision for Cyprus to remain under Britain’s possession was because of the strategic geographical 
location of Cyprus as a valuable asset for Britain’s Middle Eastern position. Bullock, for instance, argues 
that Cyprus became increasingly prominence to Britain was primarily because of the latter’s geostrategic 
and security interests towards the Middle East region (Bullock, 1983). Ball stresses that although British 
bases on Cyprus were too far to the east to be useful in the usual run of the Mediterranean operations, 
these bases were perfectly placed for use against ships trying to make a run from Greece to Syria (Ball, 
2010). According to Hatzivassiliou (2009), as the Palestine mandate collapsed and the rebellion in 
Palestine failed to be solved effectively, and the bases in Iraq and Suez became harder to hold on to, 
Cyprus was seen by the British government as preferable alternative for new bases, thus Britain should 
keep its possession of this island. As stated by Hatzivassiliou (2009): ‘Much instability has been caused 
in the Middle East by moves and rumours of moves of British troops. A stable and firmly held British 
stronghold on Cyprus is therefore of the greatest strategic importance’ (p. 1151).  
Apparently, the geostrategic significance of the Middle Eastern region to Britain has received most 
attention from historians in justifying Britain’s decision to renounce enosis and thus retain British 
sovereignty in Cyprus. These historians seem to have paid less attention to other circumstances – the 
Greek Civil War (1946-1949) in Greece, for instance – that also contributed to Britain’s decision to 
disagree on enosis. Interestingly, this neglected issue still concerns the matter of the Cold War. This 
matter therefore provides an opportunity for this paper to be considered the missing piece in the research 
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literature of this issue, and provides a thorough perusal of Bevin and his Foreign Office’s perspective on 
the question of enosis and the continuation of British rule in Cyprus. 
   
3. Research Questions 
This paper seeks to look on the attitude of Foreign Secretary Bevin towards Cyprus by the time of 
the war of nerves developed between 1945 and 1947, which he as well as the Foreign Office favoured 
Cyprus to be retained under rule, despite the Greek Cypriots’ demands for Cyprus’ independence and 
enosis with Greece. 
Given that, thus far, most research on Britain’s decision to stay in Cyprus have focused on the 
importance of Cyprus as a valuable asset for military defence of the British Middle Eastern position due 
to the island’s proximity to the Middle East, this paper seeks instead to shed light on the domestic 
problems in Greece that it had suffered from the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) in understanding Britain’s 
decision to continue its rule in Cyprus. To expound this matter, this paper rigorously scrutinises the 
opinion and stance of Bevin and the Foreign Office, who were the key decision makers in determining the 
future of Cyprus. This paper presents new insights regarding Bevin’s decision on the future of Cyprus by 
concentrating on his concern of the possibility of Greece, Cyprus’s mother country, becoming 
communist. 
 
4. Purpose of the Study 
The objective of this paper is to conduct an examination of Bevin’s decision to retain British 
control over Cyprus in connection with the Greek Civil War in Greece between 1945 and 1947. While 
this paper acknowledges the geostrategic prominence of the Middle Eastern region to Britain, this paper 
posits considerable political unrest in Greece has been disregarded in grasping why Bevin and the Foreign 
Office determined not to succumb to the Greek Cypriots’ pressure for enosis. 
The enosis matter was a delicate one for Bevin because if he wanted to strengthen the relationship 
between Britain and Greece for British security in the Middle East, Bevin should consider granting enosis 
to please Greece. However, by agreeing to enosis, Britain would lose Cyprus, a valuable asset in terms of 
military defence and its Middle Eastern position. Clearly however, either way, the decisions by Bevin in 
this Cyprus question would have negatively affected the British Middle Eastern position, such that Britain 
would not have let it happen at any cost. 
The enosis campaign gained momentum in December 1946 and continued onward. It is worth 
mentioning that at the same time, the Greek Civil War in Greece, which broke out in March 1946, had 
gone from bad to worse by the end of 1946 and continued to be fought severely throughout 1947. These 
two matters: enosis and the Greek Civil War happened almost simultaneously, and Britain was 
extensively involved in both. Apparently, these affairs created a situation more difficult than other 
previous events for Bevin to handle in terms of British strategic interest in Cyprus. Bevin was caught in a 
dilemma because either he agreed to the continuation of British rule in Cyprus or he had to support 
enosis; both decisions would bring damaging implications to Britain’s relationship with Greece and the 
British Middle Eastern position respectively. 
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5. Research Methods 
This paper is not about the enosis movement in Cyprus, but relatively it pays attention to the 
decision made by Bevin and the Foreign Office in maintaining British sovereignty although the Greek 
Cypriots and Greece kept demanding for enosis. This paper adopts qualitative approach that employs 
perusal of the archival records from the viewpoint of policy-making and diplomatic history during the 
Cold War period. Those archival records used in this paper were substantially retrieved from London 
National Archives. There are also some primary sources were slightly retrieved from the Brotherton 
Library, University of Leeds. Secondary sources were largely retrieved from the Brotherton Library and 
Edward Boyle Library at the University of Leeds as well as London British Library. 
A substantial amount of archival or primary records such as reports by the officials, official letters 
and meetings minutes produced by the Foreign Office and Foreign Secretary Office on the matter of the 
Cyprus question – enosis and the retention of British rule –, were found in FO 371 (Foreign Office 
Papers), FO 800 (Bevin’s Private Papers), CAB (Cabinet Office Papers) and DEFE (Chiefs of Staff 
Committee Papers). All these primary materials are highly credible as they demonstrate actual events in a 
particular situation. Other online archival and academic sources, such as the House of Commons 
Parliamentary Debate (HANSARD) and the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) alongside 
journal articles and monographs, respectively, have also been used in this paper. The other appropriate 
sources, for instance memoirs by politicians and diplomats who directly involved in this matter, also 
newspapers and books, were equivalent importance in understanding the matter at hand. 
In showing how the local dynamics in Greece – that Greece suffered from the Greek Civil War – 
also had a crucial impact on Bevin’s decision to dismiss enosis and thus maintain British rule in Cyprus, 
this paper extracts, compares and analyses the data from Bevin’s Private Papers (FO 800) that hold 
Bevin’s view regarding Cyprus, Greece and enosis, and the data from the Foreign Office (FO 371) that 




At the beginning of Bevin’s responsibility in handling matters regarding Cyprus, he seemed 
indecisive about the best decision for Cyprus’ future status. At first, Bevin agreed with the Foreign 
Office’s suggestion that Cyprus should be handed to Greece (FO 371, 1941).1 However, Bevin strongly 
championed a potent Britain’s overseas sphere of influence and determined in preserving Britain’s 
commitments in overseas theatres. But, Hugh Dalton as Chancellor of Exchequer, the person who 
responsible for budgeting for government expenditure, strongly recommended Bevin and his Foreign 
Office, as well as Albert V. Alexander (the Defence Minister) and the Chiefs of Staff (hereafter COS) to 
cut British overseas expenditure (CAB, 1946; Devereux, 1990).2 However, in the case of Cyprus, Bevin 
felt that Cyprus naturally belonged to Greece. Bevin also accepted the Foreign Office’s justification that 
 
1 FO371/29846/R397, Minute by Edward Warner, 16 January 1941; FO 371/23776/R4176, Memorandum of Royal Institution for 
International Affairs, 17 April 1941. 
2 CAB 131/1/DO (46) 1, Reports by Chancellor of the Exchequer, 11 January 1946. 
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the handover of Cyprus to Greece was a gesture of goodwill in improving Greek–British relations, as well 
as strengthened Britain’s position in Greece (FO 371, 1945; FO 371, 1946).3 
The COS’s opinion on this issue, it should be noted, was in complete opposition to that of the 
Foreign Office. They considered the withdrawal of Britain from Cyprus as wrong. They stated that 
Cyprus was ‘the only British possession in the Middle East area and the only territory in the Middle East 
where such measures as they consider necessary for defence can be carried out unfettered by treaties’ 
(CAB, 1945).4 Hence, the COS highly recommended the retention of British control in Cyprus. This 
consideration was driven by the island’s proximity to the Middle East, an area that greatly importance to 
Britain and its empire. The COS felt troubled by the prospect of the Soviet Union’s military action against 
the Middle East region, and this matter would endanger British predominance in that area (CAB, 1945).5 
In ensuring Britain’s continued its predominance in the Middle Eastern area, as well as to have a strategic 
military defence should war break out with the Soviet Union, the COS believed that the maintenance of 
British control in Cyprus could support these plans successfully. 
Although Bevin accepted COS’ view positively and was in favour of Cyprus to remain as part of 
Britain, Bevin however, initially believed that Greece could provide Britain with better bases than Cyprus 
(FO 371, 1945).6 Nonetheless, Bevin’s ambition for bases in Greece appeared difficult to achieve because 
of the Greek Civil War. As a result, Bevin’s position, which was originally in the Foreign Office’s favour, 
was later shaken. Bevin became uncertain about giving up Cyprus to Greece. This was apparently because 
of the situation in Greece that it became progressively worse in consequence of invasion, resistance, 
occupation, and civil war (FO 371, 1945; Bullock, 1983).7 Greece became ineffectual because of these 
crises, and Bevin expected that Greece would not be able to guarantee Cyprus’ security if Cyprus was 
ceded to Greece at that time. Therefore, Bevin began to believe that Cyprus should remain British. 
Furthermore, if the Greek government’s army was defeated by the Democratic Army of Greece, which 
was the Greek Communist Party’s military branch in the Civil War, Greece would inevitably fall under 
communist control. In short, if Cyprus was ceded to Greece at that time, the island would also turn 
communist. These circumstances would have completely endangered British predominance in the Middle 
East region. Therefore, Bevin became more certain that Cyprus should remain under Britain’s possession. 
Obviously, the Greek Civil War, one of the Cold War’s earliest conflicts, had encouraged the 
British government to handle the Cyprus question more thoroughly. As a result of growing fears of 
Greece becoming a communist nation, the British government became more convinced that Cyprus 
should stay within the British Empire. This was mainly because ‘British sovereignty denied the island to a 
potential enemy’ (Hatzivassiliou, 1997). Accordingly, enosis seemed to be an option that could not be 
considered by the British government during this crucial time. 
Although at that time Greece suffered from the Greek Civil War, the question of enosis continued 
as a more menacing threat, which was regrettable for Britain. Bevin was furious and disappointed with 
 
3 FO 371/48344/R15384, Memorandum by Orme G. Sargent, 8 September 1945; FO 371/38760, Minute by M. S. Williams, 9 April 
1946. 
4 CAB 79/39/COS (45) 215, Defence Committee to the Chiefs of Staff, 5 September 1945. 
5 CAB 79/39/COS (45) 215, Defence Committee to the Chiefs of Staff, 5 September 1945. 
6 FO 371/48360/R16295, Bevin to Hall, 18 September 1945. 
7 FO 371/48344/R15384, Memorandum by Orme G. Sargent, 8 September 1945. 
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the Greek government because of this issue. Bevin angrily pointed out that it was: ‘senseless to hand 
Cyprus to Greece if that country was on the point of going communist’ (FO 371, 1946).8 The Greek 
government’s determination to fight for enosis was regarded by Bevin as mindless, and his displeasure 
was based on the fact that Britain was a major political, financial and military supporter of Greece in the 
Greek Civil War (FO 371, 1945; FO 800, 1945; HANSARD, 1945; CAB, 1946; CAB, 1947; FO 800, 
1945-1950).9 Nonetheless, the Greek government and the Greek Cypriots had placed a stronger and more 
unified diplomatic pressure on the British government over the question of enosis in early 1947. 
Unfortunately for Britain, its economic crisis had gone from bad to worse by the beginning of 
1947 (Morgan, 1985; Robertson, 1987). Britain’s economic depression brought the British government to 
the conclusion that Britain could no longer continue giving economic and military aid to Greece (DEFE, 
1947; CAB, 1947).10 At first, the British government decided to make a massive reduction in military 
expenditure in Greece, and at the same time hoped the United States would be willing to share the burden 
with Britain (CAB, 1947).11 However, because the United States appeared hesitant to help Britain in this 
matter, Bevin decided to put pressure on the United States government by sending a letter to the United 
States Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, which informed the United States that Britain would 
completely withdraw from Greece within six months (Cook, 1989; Foreign relations of the United States 
[FRUS], 1947a; Williams, 1952).12 As a result, on 12 March 1947, the United States announced that it 
agreed to help Greece and Turkey, and the $400 million aid to these countries was given through the 
Truman Doctrine which became effective in May 1947 (FRUS, 1947b; Truman, 1956).13 
Britain’s decision to withdraw from Greece indicated that it would lose its right to freely use the 
bases in Greece. This circumstance would weaken British control and power in the Middle East region. 
Therefore, Britain was desperately in need of another base to strengthen its predominance in the Middle 
East area. Apart from the fact that Cyprus was already under British possession, Cyprus seemed to be the 
best option because of the island’s proximity to the Middle Eastern region. Bevin therefore became more 
convinced that the retention of British rule in Cyprus was the best alternative to guarantee the region of 
Middle Eastern remained under British hegemony. Even the Prime Minister, Clement C. Attlee, who had 
previously been reluctant to keep Cyprus under the British Empire, changed his mind and supported the 
continuation of British rule in Cyprus (FO 371, 1947; FO 371, 1947).14 
 
8 FO 371/58891/R18129, Minutes of conference between Bevin and Aghnidis by Frederick Warner to Foreign Office, 7 December 
1946. 
9 FO 371/48276/R13143, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Summary on the situation in Greece’ 
(Drafts), 1 August 1945; FO 800/468/Gre/45/1, Foreign Office to Athens, 1 August 1945; HANSARD, Vol. 413, Great Britain, 
Parliament, House of Commons, 20 August 1945, p. 289; CAB 131/12/DO (46) 40, Memorandum by Secretary of State to the 
Defence Committee, 13 March 1946; CAB 129/16/CP (47) 34, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Policy 
towards Greece and Turkey’, 25 January 1947; FO 800/468, Greece, 1945-1950. 
10 DEFE 5/3/COS (47) 10 (0), Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Assistance to Greece – Financial Implications’, 13 January 1947; CAB 
131/5/DO (47) 6, Defence Committee, ‘Greece: Previous Reference: DO (46) 9th Meeting, Minute 5’, 3 March 1947. 
11 CAB 131/5/DO (47) 6, Defence Committee, ‘Greece: Previous Reference: DO (46) 9th Meeting, Minute 5’, 3 March 1947. 
12 FRUS, The Near East and Africa, Vol. V, pp. 32-35, The British Embassy to the Department of State, ‘Aide-Mémoire’, 21 
February 1947. 
13 FRUS, The Near East and Africa, Vol. V, pp. 63-64, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Director of 
the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), ‘Implementation of Measures for Aid to Greece and Turkey’, 27 
February 1947. 
14 FO 371/67081/R2360, Notes of the Meeting, 7 February 1947; FO 371/68071/R2527, Arthur Creech Jones to Cypriot 
Delegation, 25 February 1947. 
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It appeared that the Cold War tension in Greece had driven the British government, specifically 
Bevin and his Foreign Office, to make a clear resolution for Britain’s national interest in Cyprus. The 
British government had made a unanimous decision over the Cyprus question that Cyprus must remain 
British. However, this was hard to achieve because of enosis. It could not be denied that the biggest 
obstacle for the British government was the question of enosis. In order to find the best solution on this 
matter, ‘the Cabinet had authorised the Foreign Secretary [Bevin] to explore the possibilities of reaching 
an understanding with the Greek Government, that they would not raise for some years to come with the 
question of the status of Cyprus’ (FO 371, 1947).15 
It is worth highlighting here that the Cabinet’s authorisation for Bevin to reach an agreement with 
the Greek government about enosis happened almost simultaneously with Bevin’s decision to cut military 
expenses in Greece. It seemed that, apart from the economic depression in Britain, Bevin’s decision to 
stop supporting Greece was driven by his anger towards the Greek government’s demand for enosis, 
which he regarded as happening at an inappropriate time. This was because, after the announcement of 
the withdrawal of British troops from Greece in March 1947, the Greek government seemed reluctant to 
raise the issue of enosis when it was approached by Bevin as requested by the Cabinet. Bevin accordingly 
told the Cabinet that this outcome was the best because he believed that no satisfying solution could be 
reached if this issue were discussed with the Greek government at that time: 
If discussions were opened with them, they were bound to raise the question of the 
Cypriots’ right to determine their future status and, as we were not ready to give them any 
satisfaction on that point, they would have no incentive to reach any understanding with us. 
There was also a risk that any such discussions would become known and would provoke 
further agitation (FO 371, 1947).16 
Based on this report to the Cabinet, the Greek government toned down its claims for enosis. The 
Greek government’s new attitude would allow for the retention of British rule in Cyprus without causing 
any hard feelings to Greece. The Greek government later gradually stepped out of the question of enosis 
and had the intention to leave it in the Greek Cypriots’ hands.  
It is important to emphasise here that apart from the strategic geographical location of Cyprus, 
Cyprus’ most valuable asset was its military virtue: the Cyprus bases were not subject to any treaties or 
understandings with any other countries (Kelling, 1990). Therefore, Britain could deploy its forces or 
military resources freely at any time without limitation because the bases were absolutely under British 
authorisation. It became one of the greatest motivations for Britain to stay and continue its sovereignty in 
Cyprus (DEFE, 1951).17 
In brief, further archival research of British records, in particular Bevin’s Private Papers of FO 
800, shows that Bevin’s concern over the local dynamics in Greece – that it suffered from the Greek Civil 
War and was on the verge of becoming communist – had also influenced Bevin to reject enosis. If Cyprus 
was ceded to Greece during this crucial time, it was believed that Cyprus too would turn communist. This 
 
15 FO 371/68082/R13855, CM (47), Conclusions, 18 March 1947. 
16 FO 371/68082/R13855, CM (47), Conclusions, 18 March 1947. 
17 DEFE 5/31/COS (51) 245, Note by the War Office: Sovereignty of Cyprus – Background, 24 April 1951. 
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matter would endanger British possession of Cyprus, and also jeopardize Britain’s predominance in the 
Mediterranean area and the Middle Eastern region. 
  
7. Conclusion 
The discussion above clearly showed that Britain would defend its privilege in Cyprus at any cost 
so that British dominance in the Middle East area could be preserved. However, the continuous 
movement for enosis by Greek Cypriots presented a major danger to Britain’s position in Cyprus. Luckily 
for Britain, even though enosis was revitalised in 1945, became stronger at the end of 1946 and turned 
into a more unified movement in early 1947, the British government succeeded through these rough years 
without surrendering to the enosis demands by the Greek Cypriots and Greece. 
This paper has analysed Britain’s decision in continuing its sovereignty in Cyprus from the 
perspective that has received less attention from previous historians – the local dynamics in Greece. As 
mentioned above, Cyprus was of substantial in keeping Britain’s predominance in the Mediterranean area 
and also the Middle Eastern region. Considering this, it is understandable why previous historians have 
mostly focused on this issue and neglected other factors or perspectives.  
It is worth reminding here that Bevin was the one who made the decision to retain British rule in 
Cyprus, and he was the one who initially championed the idea of returning Cyprus to Greece, even though 
he was fully aware that Cyprus was of great valuable to Britain in terms of geostrategic and security 
interest. It stands to reason then that there must be other factors that encouraged Bevin to change his 
decision towards Cyprus. As the decision to stay in Cyprus was made simultaneously to when Bevin was 
considering unfavourable local dynamics in Greece and the geostrategic importance of the Middle Eastern 
region as well as the Mediterranean area to Britain, this shows that the former matter – as argued by this 
paper – was another justification that had a great influence on Bevin and the Foreign Office’s stance 
towards the future of Cyprus. 
This paper has only concentrated on the perspectives of Bevin and the Foreign Office in 
understanding Britain’s decision towards Cyprus. Thus, this paper has not presented a full analysis of this 
issue from other perspectives. To present a comprehensive analysis of Britain’s decision to remain in 
Cyprus, the point of view of other departments, for instance the Colonial Office, the office of Prime 
Minister and Ministry of Defence, should be considered in future studies. 
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